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Abstract
This note studies optimal lockdown policy in a model in which the government can limit
a pandemic’s impact via a lockdown at the cost of lower economic output. A government
would like to commit to limit the extent of future lockdown in order to support more opti-
mistic investor expectations in the present. However, such a commitment is not credible since
investment decisions are sunk when the government makes the lockdown decision in the fu-
ture. The commitment problem is more severe if lockdown is sufficiently effective at limiting
disease spread or if the size of the susceptible population is sufficiently large. Credible rules
that limit a government’s ability to lock down the economy in the future can improve the effi-
ciency of lockdown policy.
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1 Introduction
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments across the world implemented lockdown
policies to limit the spread of infections. In numerous cases, those policies were eventually ex-
tended. For example, on March 22, 2020 New York Governor Andrew Cuomo extended the
statewide lockdown from April 19 to April 29. Then on April 16, the lockdown was further ex-
tended from April 29 to May 15. By the end of the following day, a total of 23 state governors had
extended lockdown policies beyond their initial plans, some by over one month.1
In this note, we study the value of government commitment in choosing a lockdown policy.
We consider a simple economy that captures policy tradeoffs based on commonly used SIRmodels
of pandemics (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927; Ferguson et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020). Investors
provide capital, the government chooses a lockdown policy, and workers supply labor. A lock-
down imposes an upper bound on labor supply while also limiting disease spread and health
costs. Our framework is general and subsumes key mechanics of many other macroeconomic
SIR models with lockdown or mitigation elements in the literature.2 An important feature of our
model is that investment is made before future lockdown policy is chosen. We think of this fea-
ture as capturing the long-term investments that businesses make while anticipating the future
trajectory of a lockdown policy.
The optimal policy under government commitment trades off the aggregate output cost with
the health benefit associated with lockdown. Aggregate output decreases with the intensity of the
lockdown through two channels. First, it decreases directly through lower labor supply, which is
curbed by the lockdown. Second, it decreases indirectly through lower investment, which results
from investors’ expectation of a lowermarginal product of capital due to the lockdown. The health
benefit of a lockdown is higher if the lockdown technology is more effective at limiting infections
or if the share of the initial susceptible population is larger.
Our main result focuses on how the extent of a lockdown is impacted by the government’s
lack of commitment. A government would like to commit to limit the extent of future lockdown
in order to support more optimistic investor expectations in the present. However, such a commit-
1These states include Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
2See for example Atkeson (2020a,b), Eichenbaum et al. (2020), Berger et al. (2020), Alvarez et al. (2020), Kaplan et al.
(2020), Jones et al. (2020), Glover et al. (2020), and Piguillem and Shi (2020).
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ment may be not credible since investment decisions are sunk when the government makes the
lockdown decision in the future. In this situation, a government without commitment imposes a
more stringent lockdown relative to the optimal policy under commitment. Investors rationally
anticipate the government’s lack of commitment, causing them to invest less than they would
in anticipation of the policy under commitment. Through this mechanism, lack of commitment
results in a larger reduction in investment and output during a lockdown than is socially optimal.
We establish conditions under which lack of commitment by the government reduces social
welfare. If the lockdown is sufficiently effective at limiting disease spread or if the number of
susceptible individuals is sufficiently high, then the optimal policy is time-inconsistent, leading to
social welfare losses. Investors provide less capital and the government chooses a more stringent
lockdown relative to what would happen under commitment. In contrast, if a lockdown is not
very effective or if the size of the susceptible population is low, then the optimal policy under
commitment involves no lockdown and is time-consistent.
These results suggest that commitment problems leading to welfare losses during a lockdown
are more likely to arise in environments with greater capacity to limit disease spread through
lockdown, such as urban areas in advanced economies. A similar commitment problem arises
when considering lockdowns early in a pandemic, when the size of the susceptible population is
high and herd immunity has not yet developed.
Our results imply that a credible government lockdown policy plan can improve the efficiency
of lockdown policy. In principle, such a plan can depend on new information that arrives during
a lockdown, such as estimates of disease mortality, the state of the economy, the likelihood of vac-
cine discovery, or the medical system’s capacity. Some of this information may not be contractible,
in which case a rigid plan can be too constraining, and policy flexibility is desirable. To capture this
value of flexibility, we extend our model to allow the government to learn new noncontractible
information before choosing a lockdown policy. In this extended model, we show that rules that
impose limits on future lockdown policy can increase social welfare, even though policy flexibility
is valuable. The reason is that a government lacking commitment chooses more lockdown in the
future than is socially desirable. As such, a marginally binding rule increases social welfare by
raising investment and output at no cost of reduced policy flexibility.
We emphasize that our analysis does not imply that lockdowns are socially harmful. In fact,
reducing or lifting the lockdown in our model is detrimental if the resulting health costs exceed
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the immediate economic gains. Our model abstracts from policy mistakes involving insufficient
degrees of lockdown by assuming that policy is chosen by a benevolent government that maxi-
mizes long-run social welfare.3 Our analysis points to the value of a government plan that defines
limits on the extent of future lockdown. Such a plan is beneficial if the expected future economic
gains of those limits—from stimulating investment toward its efficient level—exceed the health
costs.
Our analysis relates to the nascent literature on optimal policy in a pandemic, with some re-
cent contributions listed in footnote 2. This literature focuses on various aspects of government
policy, including the optimal intensity and timing of lockdowns. We depart from this literature by
focusing on the value of government commitment in the context of lockdown policy.
The mechanism underlying the time inconsistency of optimal policy in our setting is in line
with the broader insights in the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1980), and in particular
the literature that studies government commitment in the context of capital taxation (Chari and
Kehoe, 1990; Klein et al., 2008; Aguiar et al., 2009). While lack of commitment in ourmodel distorts
capital investment as in these frameworks, there are two important differences. First, a lockdown
distorts capital investment not directly via taxation, but indirectly by suppressing labor. Second, in
our setting, these distortions from lockdown do not increase the government budget, but reduce
the long-term health costs of disease spread. Since health costs derive from an underlying SIR
model, the value of reducing these costs cannot be represented by a simple concave function, as in
a typical model of public goods. This means that the usual methods for comparative statics cannot
be applied here.
Our analysis of rules in the presence of noncontractible information relates to the literature on
commitment versus flexibility in policymaking (Amador et al., 2006; Athey et al., 2005; Halac and
Yared, 2014, 2018). The result that rules can strictly increase social welfare even if flexibility is valu-
able is consistent with that work. However, in contrast to that work, we obtain this result under
milder restrictions on the utility function and the distribution of noncontractible information.
3This assumption may be violated in an extension of our model in which political economy considerations lead the
government to overweigh immediate economic gains relative to future health costs of relaxing a lockdown.
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2 Model
We consider a simple three-period economy. In the first period, investors provide capital. In the
second period, the government chooses a lockdown policy and workers supply labor. In the third
period, disease spread follows an SIR model of disease spread and is affected by the lockdown
policies of the second period. Lockdown imposes an upper bound on labor supply in the second
period while also limiting disease spread and health costs from the third period onward. Impor-
tantly, the government chooses an optimal lockdown policy after capital investment is sunk.
2.1 Economic Environment
There are three periods t = 0, 1, 2. At t = 0, competitive external investors provide capital k.
At t = 1, a continuum of mass 1 of workers supply up to one unit of labor inelastically subject
to a binding upper bound ℓ ∈ [0, 1] representing the degree of lockdown. If ℓ = 1, there is no
lockdown and the maximum amount of labor is supplied. If ℓ = 0 there is maximal lockdown. A
worker’s budget constraint is
c = wℓ, (1)
where c is consumption and w is the market wage. Workers have linear utility over consumption
c and receive continuation value V as a function of the future state of the economy.
Capital k combined with labor input ℓ generates output y according to the following produc-
tion function:
y = kαℓ1−α, (2)
where α ∈ (0, 1). We assume for simplicity that capital depreciates fully. Investors can invest
domestically or abroad at a rate of return r∗.4 As such, in a competitive equilibrium, the marginal
product of capital obeys the following no-arbitrage condition:
r∗ = αkα−1ℓ1−α (3)
4We consider an open economy for simplicity. The analysis can be easily extended to a closed economywith workers
and capitalists.
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Labor is competitively supplied so wages equal their marginal product given by
w = (1− α) kαℓ−α. (4)
Combining (3) and (4), it follows that in a competitive equilibrium—where capital adjusts to the
anticipated level labor supply—consumption given by equation (1) satisfies
c = Aℓ, (5)
where A = (1 − α)(α/r∗)α/(1−α). Note that equation (5) features consumption that is linear in
labor input ℓ because capital optimally adjusts to the given level of labor input.
2.2 Disease Spread and Lockdown Policy
Wemodel disease spread as following an SIRmodel (Kermack andMcKendrick, 1927; Ferguson et
al., 2020;Wang et al., 2020), whichwe allow to depend on a lockdown policy, as in Atkeson (2020a),
Eichenbaum et al. (2020), and Alvarez et al. (2020). Specifically, we define the state of the economy
at time t = 1, 2 as Ωt = {St, It,Rt,Dt}, where St ≥ 0 is the mass of susceptible individuals, It ≥ 0
is the mass of infected and contagious individuals, Rt ≥ 0 is the mass of recovered individuals,
and Dt ≥ 0 is the mass of deceased individuals. Since the population at date t = 1 of worker is
normalized to 1 and D1 = 0 without loss of generality, it follows that
S1 + I1 + R1 = 1 and (6)
S2 + I2 + R2 + D2 = 1. (7)
An SIR model defines a mapping Γ (·) that implies a law of motion
Ω2 = Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ) , (8)
where the state at date t = 2 is a function of the state at date t = 1, the degree of lockdown at date
t = 1, and a parameter κ ∈ [0, 1] capturing the effectiveness of the lockdown technology. Note
that implicit in our formulation is the existence of a state Ω0 and initial lockdown policy at date
t = 0 that determine Ω1. Because these are exogenous, we take the state Ω1 as given without loss
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of generality.
Social welfare equals
c+V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) , (9)
where V (·) is a continuation value to society that is a function of the future state. The continua-
tion value V (·) captures the long-term costs of bad health and mortality associated with disease
spread, as guided by the future law of motion of the state Ωt. Note that through the law of motion
for Ω2 given by equation (8), the continuation value will be impacted by the degree of lockdown,
which determines ℓ, and its effectiveness κ.
We make the following intuitive assumption.
Assumption 1. The value of V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) is independent of ℓ if either (i) κ = 0 or (ii) S1 = 0.
The first part of Assumption 1 states that the continuation value to society is independent of
the degree of lockdown if the lockdown technology is maximally ineffective at limiting disease
spread (i.e., if κ = 0). Since disease spread is independent of the degree of lockdown in this case,
future payoffs will not depend on lockdown decisions.
The second part of Assumption 1 states that lockdown also becomes irrelevant if the size of
the initial susceptible population is zero (i.e., if S1 = 0). That there are no susceptible individuals
means that the entire population is either infected, recovered, or dead, meaning that the disease
cannot spread. As such, we assume that disease dynamics are determined only by epidemiological
parameters guiding recovery and death rates, which we assume are independent of lockdown.
In addition to this intuitive assumption, we make the following technical assumption. In the
statement of this assumption and for the remainder of our paper, we consider comparative statics
with respect to variations in the susceptible population S1 that are accommodated by variations
in the recovered population R1.
Assumption 2. The function V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) is differentiable in ℓ and the derivative of V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ))
with respect to ℓ, conditional on any ℓ ∈ (0, 1), is (i) continuous in κ and (ii) continuous in S1.
Assumption 2 is a technical assumption that guarantees that the continuation value is well-
behaved. This assumption allows us to prove our results, which rely on the marginal payoffs
from lockdown changing gradually with respect to parameters κ and S1.
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Assumptions 1 and 2 together are sufficient to support our theoretical conclusions. Note that
these assumptions are satisfied in many recent macroeconomic models with SIRmodules in which
disease dynamics respond smoothly to lockdown policies. In these frameworks, the probability
of a person’s transition from the susceptible state to the infected state is continuously decreasing
in the effectiveness of the lockdown technology κ and continuously increasing in the size of the
susceptible population S1. See Eichenbaum et al. (2020) and Alvarez et al. (2020) for examples of
models consistent with these assumptions.
2.3 Timeline
The order of events is as follows:
1. At t = 0, investors choose investment k;
2. At t = 1, the government chooses lockdown policy ℓ, workers supply labor subject to the
lockdown policy, output y is produced, and workers and investors consume their respective
shares of income; and
3. At t = 2, the disease spread progresses according to the transition function Γ.
A key feature of our model is that investment is made before the lockdown policy is chosen.
We think of this feature as capturing the long-term investments that businesses make while antic-
ipating the future trajectory of a lockdown policy. In support of this idea, recent survey evidence
shows that businesses that expect a more prolonged crisis are more likely to expect to shut down
(Bartik et al., 2020). We will explore in detail the implications of this sequencing of investment
and lockdown decision for the optimal policy under commitment compared to that under lack of
commitment.
3 Optimal Policy under Commitment
Suppose that the government can commit to a lockdown policy ℓ prior to investment decisions.
This means that capital optimally adjusts to anticipated labor supply, which, in turn, is determined
by the lockdown policy. Substituting consumption under the capital no-arbitrage condition from
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equation (5) into (9), the government under commitment solves the following problem:
max
ℓ∈[0,1]
{Aℓ+V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ))} (10)
Importantly, substituting the capital no-arbitrage condition before solving for the optimal degree
of lockdown means that the government under commitment takes into account the reaction of in-
vestment to the anticipation of its policies. Define Vℓ(Γ(Ω1, ℓ, κ)) ≡ dV(Γ(Ω1, ℓ, κ))/dℓ as the total
derivative of the continuation value with respect to labor input. The first-order necessary condi-
tion associated with an interior solution to the problem of the government under commitment is
simply
−Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) = A. (11)
In choosing the degree of lockdown, the government weighs two opposing forces, as in Gourin-
chas (2020) and Hall et al. (2020). On one hand, it considers the future health benefits in terms of
reduced mortality from inhibiting the disease spread, as captured by the marginal change in the
continuation value−Vℓ(Γ(Ω1, ℓ, κ)). On the other hand, it considers the economic costs captured by
foregone marginal product of labor given by A. In turn, the economic costs are twofold. First, con-
ditional on the level of capital, lockdown has a direct impact on output by limiting labor supply.
Second, lockdown has an indirect impact on output by reducing the marginal product of capital
which reduces investment. The government’s ability to commit gives it the ability to take into ac-
count both of these factors, leading it to choose the optimal lockdown in anticipation of investors’
reaction to the policy.
We also consider two potential corner solutions to the government’s problem under commit-
ment: complete lockdown and no lockdown. Under complete lockdown, ℓ = 0 and
−Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) > A. (12)
Conversely, under no lockdown, ℓ = 1 and
−Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) < A. (13)
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4 Optimal Policy under Lack of Commitment
Under lack of commitment, the government takes capital k as given when choosing the lockdown
policy at date t = 1. We can substitute for consumption c in equation (9) using equations (1), (2),
and (4) to write the program for the the government under lack of commitment at date t = 1 as
max
ℓ∈[0,1]
{
(1− α) kαℓ1−α +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ))
}
. (14)
Importantly, not substituting the capital no-arbitrage condition before solving for the optimal de-
gree of lockdown means that the government under no commitment does not take into account
the reaction of investment to the anticipation of its policies. The derivative of the government
objective function with respect to ℓ is
(1− α)2 kαℓ−α +Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) . (15)
This expression makes clear that a government lacking commitment undervalues the economic
cost of lockdown. This is because it takes capital decisions as sunk and does not internalize the
impact of lockdown on ex ante investor expectations.5 Investors take this lack of commitment
into account when choosing investment. Therefore, the capital no-arbitrage condition applies
with respect to the optimal behavior of government at the time of it choosing a lockdown policy.
To see what this means, we substitute the capital no-arbitrage condition in equation (3), which
accounts for optimal investor behavior, into equation (15) and rewrite the equilibrium derivative
of the government objective function with respect to ℓ:
(1− α) A+Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) (16)
This derivative shows that in equilibrium, themarginal cost of lockdown for a government lacking
commitment is (1− α) A. This is below the marginal cost of lockdown for a government under
commitment, which is equal to A. At the same time, the marginal benefit from lockdown is the
same regardless of government commitment and given by −Vℓ(Γ(Ω1, ℓ, κ)).
5Note that for there to be a commitment problem, it is necessary that the government puts less weight on the welfare
of outside investors than on domestic workers. Our insights would remain qualitatively unchanged if the government’s
weight on investors were positive but less than that on workers.
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The FOC associated with an interior solution to the problem of the government under lack of
commitment is simply
−Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) = (1− α) A. (17)
As previously, we also consider two potential corner solutions to the government’s problem under
lack of commitment: complete lockdown and no lockdown. Under complete lockdown, ℓ = 0 and
−Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) > (1− α) A. (18)
Conversely, under no lockdown, ℓ = 1 and
−Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) < (1− α) A. (19)
Denote by ℓc the optimal lockdown policy under full commitment and by ℓn the equilibrium
lockdown under lack of commitment. Then we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 (Time Inconsistency). Lockdown under no commitment is weakly larger than lockdown
under full commitment: ℓn ≤ ℓc. Moreover, lockdown under no commitment is strictly larger than lock-
down under full commitment if either level of lockdown is interior: ℓn < ℓc if ℓc ∈ (0, 1) or ℓn ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 shows that an implication of lack of government commitment is that a subopti-
mal lockdown policy may be chosen. The reason for this is that, absent commitment, the govern-
ment undervalues the economic cost of lockdown, leading to more lockdown and lower output
than would be optimal from an ex ante perspective.
In the next proposition, we examine how the implications of lack of government commitment
are impacted by the effectiveness of the lockdown technology with respect to limiting disease
spread, as indexed by κ. We focus on cases in which the optimal policy under commitment in-
volve some lockdown for some values of κ ∈ (0, 1). We then provide conditions under which the
government under lack of commitment deviates from the commitment policy.
Proposition 2 (Effect of Lockdown Technology). Suppose that there exists a lockdown technology for
which the optimal policy under commitment involves some lockdown, that is, ℓc < 1 for some κ ∈ (0, 1).
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Then the following is true:
1. If the lockdown technology has low effectiveness, then the policy under full commitment and under
lack of commitment involves no lockdown. That is, ∃κ ∈ (0, 1) such that ℓc = ℓn = 1 if κ ≤ κ.
2. If the lockdown technology has intermediate effectiveness, then the policy under full commitment is
no lockdown and under lack of commitment is positive lockdown. That is, ∃κ ∈ (κ, 1] such that
ℓc = 1 > ℓn if κ ∈ (κ, κ).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The following proposition considers policy under commitment and lack of commitment as a
function of the initial number of susceptible individuals S1.
Proposition 3 (Effect of Initial Health Status). Suppose that there exists a population share of susceptible
individuals for which the optimal policy under commitment involves some lockdown, that is, ℓc < 1 for some
S1 ∈ (0, 1). Then the following is true:
1. If the initial number of susceptible individuals is low, then the policy under full commitment and
under lack of commitment involves no lockdown. That is, ∃S1 ∈ (0, 1) such that ℓ
c = ℓn = 1 if
S1 ≤ S1.
2. If there is an intermediate number of susceptible individuals, then the policy under full commitment
is no lockdown and under lack of commitment is positive lockdown. That is, ∃S1 ∈ (S1, 1] such that
ℓc = 1 > ℓn if κ ∈
(
S1, S1
)
.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 2 and is thus omitted.
If the lockdown technology is sufficiently ineffective at preventing disease (Proposition 2) or if
the fraction of susceptible individuals is sufficiently low (Proposition 3), then there is no problem
of lack of commitment. Both under commitment and under lack of commitment the economic cost
of any lockdown dwarfs the mortality benefits, and having no lockdown is optimal. These results
change if the lockdown technology has intermediate effectiveness. In this circumstance, while it
is optimal for the government under commitment to not lockdown the economy, the government
under lack of commitment which undervalues the cost of lockdown will prefer to lockdown the
economy.6
6A natural question concerns comparative statics for κ > κ and S0 > S0. Establishing these comparative statics
would require additional assumptions beyond those made above.
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5 Rules that Limit Future Lockdown
We have established that a government under lack of commitment may choose more severe lock-
down than a government under full commitment. As a result, lack of commitment can lead to an
economic contraction at date t = 1 that is deeper than is socially optimal.
In this environment, a credible lockdown policy plan can be socially optimal. Formally, sup-
pose that rather than choosing a policy ℓ ∈ [0, 1], the policy decision ℓ is exogenously constrained
to the optimum under commitment, ℓ = ℓc. Such a constraint on policy improves investor expec-
tations of the future and can improve the efficiency of lockdown policy.
In principle, such a plan can depend on new information that arrives during a lockdown, such
as estimates of disease mortality, the state of the economy, the likelihood of vaccine discovery, or
the medical system’s capacity. To capture this idea, suppose that a state variable θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
, with
θ < θ, is realized after investment k has been made at date t = 0 and before policy ℓ is chosen at
date t = 1. Suppose that θ is drawn from a probability density function (pdf) f (θ) over θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
.
Conditional on θ, social welfare can be written as7
c+V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ) , θ) . (20)
In this extended model, the optimal policies under commitment and no commitment depend
on the realization of θ and are denoted by ℓc (θ) and ℓn (θ), respectively. An argument analogous
to that in Proposition 1 implies that ℓc (θ) ≥ ℓn (θ). In other words, conditional on θ, the gov-
ernment lacking commitment chooses a weakly larger lockdown than the government under full
commitment. If θ represents contractible information, then a credible plan that imposes the con-
straint ℓ = ℓc (θ) can increase social welfare since it forces the government without commitment
to choose the policy under full commitment.
In practice, some of the information in θ may not be contractible, in which case a rigid plan can
be too constraining, and flexibility is desirable. In this case, we can show that bounded discretion
in the form of a rule ℓ > 0 that constrains the government to a policy choice ℓ ∈ [ℓ, 1] is socially
desirable. Formally, let us suppose that ℓn (θ) is a decreasing function of θ that is continuous
in a neighborhood below θ. Therefore, higher values of θ are associated with more lockdown.
7While we introduce the state variable θ as an argument outside of the disease transition function Γ(·), this is without
loss of generality and we could allow for θ to have a direct effect on disease spread by allowing it to index Γ(·).
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Moreover, let us suppose that the pdf f (θ) is strictly positive and is continuous in a neighborhood
below θ. We can use analogous arguments as in the literature on commitment versus flexibility
in policymaking (Amador et al., 2006; Athey et al., 2005; Halac and Yared, 2014, 2018) to show
that rules that put a limit on lockdown can boost social welfare, even if the rule cannot depend
explicitly on the realization of θ.8
Proposition 4 (Value of Rules). Consider an economy where lockdown under full commitment and under
lack of commitment is never maximal, namely ℓc (θ) ≥ ℓn (θ) > 0 for all θ, and where optimal lockdown
under lack of commitment is sometimes interior, namely ℓn (θ) < 1 for some θ. Then a rule that imposes a
lower bound ℓ on labor supply strictly increases social welfare under lack of commitment.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Proposition 4 shows that the introduction of rules increases social welfare even if there is a
value to flexibility. The intuition is that a government lacking commitment chooses more lock-
down in the future than is socially desirable. As such, a marginally binding rule increases social
welfare by raising investment and output at no cost of reduced policy flexibility. A key part of
this argument is that extreme levels of future lockdown are assumed to never be optimal under
commitment given current information. Thus, a rule that makes such extreme choices infeasible
in the future can improve investor expectations and mitigate the economic costs of a lockdown.
Our environment could be extended to one in which this assumption is violated, and extreme
choices are sometimes optimal in the future even under commitment. In this environment, a limit
on future lockdowns with an escape clause under extreme conditions could be optimal.9
6 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed the value of government commitment in choosing a lockdown policy. A gov-
ernment would like to commit to limit the extent of future lockdown in order to support more
optimistic investor expectations in the present. However, such a commitment is not credible since
investment decisions are sunk when the government makes the lockdown decision. Our results
suggest that welfare losses due to lack of commitment are more likely to arise in environments
8Because the function V (·) is not concave and the pdf f (·) can have a flexible structure, the following proposition
does not follow directly from previous work.
9See Halac and Yared (forthcoming) for a discussion of threshold contracts with escape clauses.
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with greater capacity to limit disease spread through lockdown, such as urban areas in advanced
economies. These problems may also arise early in a pandemic, when the size of the susceptible
population is high and herd immunity has not yet developed. Our analysis highlights the value
of lockdown to mitigate the health costs of pandemics, together with the importance of defining
the limits of future lockdowns. Through their impact on business expectations, such limits can
improve the efficiency of lockdown policy.
Our analysis leaves several interesting avenues for future research. First, in establishing our
results we have assumed that the future health benefit of lockdown is the same in the economy
under full commitment and under no commitment. This is a good approximation to an economy
reaching the end of a pandemic inwhich there is no lockdown in the future. However, the dynamic
analysis of an economy earlier in a pandemic requires the government to consider the path of
future lockdown policy, which will depend on the government’s degree of commitment in the
future. Such an analysis is challenging since a government considers the impact of current policy
on disease spread as well as on the incentives of future governments.
Second, we have evaluated the effect of rules that limit lockdowns assuming that governments
adhere to such rules. In practice, rules may be broken and the private sector may be uncertain
about the government’s commitment to respecting them. In the context of capital taxation, Phelan
(2006) and Dovis and Kirpalani (2019) show that this consideration leads the private sector to
dynamically update its beliefs about a government’s ability to commit. We conjecture that in our
framework, this uncertainty could cause investors to react to lockdown extensions by becoming
increasingly pessimistic about the government’s ability to commit to lifting a future lockdown.
This could lead to further declines in investment and economic activity in response to lockdown
extensions.
Finally, our analysis ignores the availability of monetary and fiscal policy tools, as in Guerrieri
et al. (2020). In our framework, these tools could not only mitigate the immediate economic costs
of a pandemic, but also boost investment, thus counteracting future economic costs from underin-
vestment due to the government’s lack of commitment. We leave the exploration of how optimal
lockdown policy interacts with monetary and fiscal policy under lack of government commitment
as an interesting subject of further research.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. To prove the first part of the statement, suppose by contradiction that ℓc < ℓn. The govern-
ment under full commitment must weakly prefer choosing ℓc to ℓn, meaning
Alc +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, κ)) ≥ Aln +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n, κ)) . (21)
Moreover, the government under lack of commitment must weakly prefer choosing ℓn over ℓc,
conditional on the level of capital k chosen by investors in anticipation of the lack of commitment:
(1− α) kα [ℓn]1−α +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n, κ)) ≥ (1− α) kα [ℓc]1−α +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, κ)) . (22)
Substitution of equation (3) into (22) implies that equation (22) can be rewritten as
(1− α) Aln +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n, κ)) ≥ (1− α) Aln
[
ℓc
ℓn
]1−α
+V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, κ)) (23)
Since ℓc < ℓn and α ∈ (0, 1), it follows that
ℓ
n
[
ℓc
ℓn
]1−α
=
[
ℓn
ℓc
]α
ℓ
c
> ℓ
c. (24)
Substitution of (24) into (23) yields
(1− α) Aln +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n, κ)) > (1− α) Alc +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, κ)) . (25)
Combining (21) and (25), we get
(1− α) A (ℓn − ℓc) > A (ℓn − ℓc) , (26)
which is a contradiction. Therefore, ℓn ≤ ℓc. To prove the second part of the statement, consider
ℓc ∈ (0, 1) or ℓn ∈ (0, 1). Suppose by contradiction that ℓc = ℓn ∈ (0, 1). Since the optimum is
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interior, the FOC for the government under commitment is necessary for optimality:
A+Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, κ)) = 0. (27)
Analogously, the FOC for the government under no commmitment following (16) is:
(1− α) A+Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n, κ)) = 0. (28)
For equations (27) and (28) to simultaneously hold under ℓc = ℓn would require
A = (1− α) A, (29)
which clearly represents a contradiction. We conclude that ℓn < ℓc.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Proof of Step 1. We establish that there exists κ′ ∈ (0, 1) for which lc < 1 and ln < 1 are not
solutions to the government’s problem if κ ≤ κ′. Suppose that κ = 0. Then the optimal policy un-
der full commitment and lack of commitment is no lockdown. To see this, the benefit of lockdown
is given by the marginal continuation value, which by Assumption 1 satisfies Vℓ(Γ(Ω1, ℓ, 0)) = 0
given κ = 0, while the cost of lockdown is given by the foregone economic output, which equals
A for the government with commitment and (1− α)A for the government without commitment.
Since the cost of lockdown is strictly positive with or without commitment, lockdown is never
optimal. Now suppose that κ = ε for ε > 0 arbitrarily small. We now show that under κ = ε the
optimal policies under both commitment and lack of commitment necessarily admit no lockdown.
Consider first the case of a government with commitment. Suppose by way of contradiction that
the optimal policy is ℓc < 1 for some εc > 0. The FOC required for optimality of this policy is that
A+Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, εc)) ≤ 0. (30)
For any ℓc ∈ [0, 1), the left hand side of (30) approaches A > 0 as εc → 0 by Assumptions 1 and 2.
However, this contradicts (30) for εc sufficiently small. This establishes that ℓ
c = 1 is the unique
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solution for εc > 0 sufficiently small. Let εc > 0 denote the highest value of εc for which inequality
(30) is violated for all ℓc ∈ [0, 1], and define εc = 1 if it is never violated for any εc ∈ [0, 1] and
ℓc ∈ [0, 1]. Now consider the case of lack of commitment. An exactly analogous argument, with
A replaced by (1− α)A proves the claim that ℓn = 1 is the unique solution for εn > 0 sufficiently
small. Let εn > 0 denote the highest value of εn for which the analog of inequality (30) for the
government under no commitment (i.e., with A replaced by (1− α)A) is violated for all ℓc ∈ [0, 1],
and define εn = 1 if it is never violated for any εn ∈ [0, 1] and ℓn ∈ [0, 1]. By continuity, ℓc = ℓn = 1
is the unique solution if κ ≤ κ′ for κ′ = min{εc, εn} ∈ (0, 1].
Proof of Step 2. We establish that there exists κ ∈ [κ′, 1) for which lc = 1 and ln = 1 are solutions
to the government’s problem if κ ≤ κ. Define κ as the highest value of κ such that for all κ ≤ κ and
all ℓ ∈ [0, 1], the following condition holds
(1− α) A+V (Γ (Ω1, 1, κ)) ≥ (1− α) Aℓ
1−α +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ, κ)) . (31)
The left hand side of (31) corresponds to equilibrium welfare for government under no commit-
ment in an equilibrium under no lockdown, and the right hand side of (31) corresponds to the
value of deviating to some ℓ. We begin by establishing that κ ≥ κ′. This follows by part (i) since
for κ ≤ κ′, the unique equilibrium under no commitment admits no lockdown, which means that
(31) must hold. We now show that κ < 1. The condition of the proposition states that the policy
under full commitment admits some positive lockdown for some κ ∈ (0, 1). More specifically,
it must be the case that under such a value of κ, the choice of ℓc < 1 dominates choosing no
lockdown, namely
Aℓc +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, κ)) ≥ (1− α) A+V (Γ (Ω1, 1, κ)) . (32)
Note that if (32) holds then (31) is violated for ℓ = ℓc. Suppose not and suppose that
(1− α) A+V (Γ (Ω1, 1, κ)) ≥ (1− α) A [ℓ
c]1−α +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, κ)) . (33)
Combining equations (32) and (33) yields
(1− α) A
(
1− [ℓc]1−α
)
> A (1− ℓc) , (34)
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which cannot hold since α ∈ (0, 1) and ℓc < 1. Therefore, by continuity of V (·) in Assumption 2,
it follows that κ < 1.
Proof of Step 3. We establish that there exists κ ∈ (κ, 1) for which lc < 1 and ln = 1 are not
solutions to the government’s problem if κ ∈ (κ, κ). Suppose that κ = κ + ε for ε > 0 arbitrarily
small. We can establish that ℓn < 1. Suppose it were the case that ℓn = 1. Because (31) is violated
at κ = κ + ε, then there exists some ℓ such that the government under lack of commitment can
deviate and market itself strictly better off. Therefore, ℓn < 1. Now consider the value of ℓc and
suppose it were the case that ℓc < 1. For the government under commitment to prefer ℓc < 1 to
no lockdown, it is necessary that
[V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, κ + ε))−V (Γ (Ω1, 1, κ + ε))] > A (1− ℓ
c) . (35)
for some ℓc < 1. Consider the left hand side of (35) as ε → 0, holding ℓc fixed. It follows from the
definition of κ in equation (31) that
(1− α) A
(
1− [ℓc]1−α
)
≥ lim
ε→0
[V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
c, κ + ε))−V (Γ (Ω1, 1, κ + ε))] . (36)
Combining equations (35) and (36) implies that
(1− α) A
(
1− [ℓc]1−α
)
> A (1− ℓc) (37)
which is a contradiction. Therefore, ℓc = 1. The existence of κ such that ℓc = 1 > ℓn if κ ∈ (κ, κ)
thus follows from continuity.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider a rule ℓ (ε) = ℓn
(
θ − ε
)
for ε > 0 arbitrarily small. We will establish that such
a rule strictly increases social welfare. Let ℓn (θ) denote the policy under no commitment in the
absence of a rule and let ℓr (θ, ε) denote the policy under no commitment subject to a rule. After
introducing a rule, the change in social welfare conditional on θ < θ − ε is zero since the policy
under no commitment is unchanged. The change in social welfare come from θ ∈
[
θ − ε, θ
]
and
21
equals
ˆ
θ
θ−ε
[A (ℓr (θ, ε)− ℓn (θ)) +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
r (θ, ε) , κ) , θ)−V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n (θ) , κ) , θ)] f (θ) dθ. (38)
We first establish that (38) is bounded from below by
ˆ
θ
θ−ε
[
A
(
ℓ
n
(
θ − ε
)
− ℓn (θ)
)
+V
(
Γ
(
Ω1, ℓ
n
(
θ − ε
)
, κ
)
, θ
)
−V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n (θ) , κ) , θ)
]
f (θ) dθ.
(39)
If for a given θ ∈
[
θ − ε, θ
]
we have that ℓr (θ, ε) = ℓn
(
θ − ε
)
, then
Aℓr (θ, ε) +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
r (θ, ε) , κ) , θ) = Aℓn
(
θ − ε
)
+V
(
Γ
(
Ω1, ℓ
n
(
θ − ε
)
, κ
)
, θ
)
. (40)
Now suppose that for a given θ ∈
[
θ − ε, θ
]
, ℓr (θ, ε) > ℓn
(
θ − ε
)
. The government under no
commitment must weakly prefers choosing ℓr (θ, ε) in equilibrium to ℓn
(
θ − ε
)
< ℓr (θ, ε):
(1− α) Aℓr (θ, ε) +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
r (θ, ε) , κ) , θ)
≥ (1− α) Aℓr (θ, ε)
(
ℓn
(
θ − ε
)
ℓr (θ, ε)
)1−α
+V
(
Γ
(
Ω1, ℓ
n
(
θ − ε
)
, κ
)
, θ
)
. (41)
Since ℓn
(
θ − ε
)
< ℓr (θ, ε) and α ∈ (0, 1), it follows that
ℓ
r (θ, ε)
(
ℓn
(
θ − ε
)
ℓr (θ, ε)
)1−α
= ℓn
(
θ − ε
) ( ℓr (θ, ε)
ℓn
(
θ − ε
)
)α
> ℓ
n
(
θ − ε
)
. (42)
Substitution of equation (42) into (41) implies that
Aℓr (θ, ε) +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
r (θ, ε) , κ) , θ) ≥ Aℓn
(
θ − ε
)
+V
(
Γ
(
Ω1, ℓ
n
(
θ − ε
)
, κ
)
, θ
)
. (43)
Conditions (40) and (43) thus imply that the expression in equation (38) is bounded from below
by (39).
Now consider the value of (39). We can show that it is positive for ε > 0 arbitrarily small.
Consider θ ∈
[
θ − ε, θ
]
. For a given ε > 0, define υ (ε) > 0 as the highest value υ (ε) such that
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υ(ε) < θ − θ − ε and also
A (ℓn (θ − υ)− ℓn (θ)) +V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n (θ − υ) , κ) , θ)−V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n (θ) , κ) , θ) > 0 (44)
for all υ ∈ [0, υ (ε)) and all θ ∈
[
θ − ε, θ
]
. To see why υ (ε) exists, consider the first order condition
that defines ℓn (θ)
(1− α) A+Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n (θ) , κ) , θ) = 0 (45)
It follows that
A+Vℓ (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n (θ) , κ) , θ) > 0, (46)
which means that social welfare is strictly increasing in ℓ in a neighborhood around ℓn (θ). The
existence of υ (ε) follows from the fact that ℓn (θ − υ) is strictly decreasing in θ. Note that that
υ (ε) > ε if ε = 0. Moreover, by continuity, there exists some ε > 0 such that υ (ε) > ε. Thus, (44)
holds for υ = ε−
(
θ − θ
)
< υ (ε), which means that
[
A
(
ℓ
n
(
θ − ε
)
− ℓn (θ)
)
+V
(
Γ
(
Ω1, ℓ
n
(
θ − ε
)
, κ
)
, θ
)
−V (Γ (Ω1, ℓ
n (θ) , κ) , θ)
]
> 0 (47)
for all θ ∈
[
θ − ε, θ
]
. This means that (39) is strictly positive for ε > 0. Therefore, the perturbation
strictly increase welfare.
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